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Abstract 
While threats of violence are relatively common in U.S. K-12 schools, the likelihood of a threat being 
carried out is very low. School leaders must take all threats of school violence seriously but must also 
have evidence-informed means to discern less-serious, transient threats from more serious, substantive 
ones. School violence threat assessment training is a vital professional development tool, to ensure 
safer schools while avoiding unnecessary labeling of students or overly harsh consequences through 
disciplinary over-reaction. This manual supplements an abbreviated professional development training 
presentation on school violence threat assessment based on research and models developed by Dr. 
Dewey Cornell, University of Virginia. It’s intended audience is K-12 school administrators, school 
and community based mental health professionals, teachers, case managers, social workers, law 
enforcement personnel, ancillary school staff, and school board members, among others. This is not 
intended to be a replacement for Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines training, but 
rather an abbreviated overview of best practices in K-12 school violence threat assessment. All the 
necessary components to effectively deliver this training are here, to include instructor preparation, 
training overview and objectives, pre- and post-assessments, instructional notes, training and instructor 
evaluation, supplemental forms and worksheets, and literary references. With adequate preparation and 
content review, any professional instructor will be able to deliver this training effectively and 
efficiently. A slide presentation template is available from this manual’s author upon request. School 
violence threat assessment is a dynamic and growing field of practice that will inevitably adapt to new 
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Introduction 
 Until the 1990’s, K-12 school safety in the United States had been largely taken for granted.  
Schools represented central community gathering and learning spaces that were safe havens for 
children. Several high-profile mass shootings in schools, culminating with the 1999 massacre of 13 
people at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado spawned sweeping changes in school safety 
practices throughout the United States. Since Columbine, at least 143 more people have been murdered 
in school shootings, with hundreds more injured. Several of those incidents, such as Virginia Tech in 
2007, Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in 2018, 
proved even deadlier than Columbine.   
 With a renewed focus on school safety as a central concept for effective student learning 
climates, school safety and security strategies have received significant attention from educational and 
law enforcement leaders. While many evolving school safety practices have included physical plant 
upgrades, technology improvements, armed resource officers, and other means to “target-harden” 
schools, a growing desire for practical, cost-efficient, and prevention-oriented strategies has taken hold 
in education. (Trump, 2011).  
 While threats of violence are relatively common in U.S. schools, the likelihood of a school 
shooting or other violent act taking place is extremely low. This creates a conundrum for school 
leaders, who by policy, ethics, and law, are compelled to take all violent threats seriously (Allen, 
Cornell, Lorek, & Sheras, 2008). The task of discerning the difference between an empty and a serious 
threat is difficult, considering the paucity of reliable indicators for threat-related violence (Mitchell & 
Palk, 2016). The reality is that most violent threats in schools are maladaptive responses from children 
and adolescents who lack frustration tolerance, have poor emotional coping skills, lack healthy social 
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development and emotional control, and internalize disorders, all traits common to these age groups 
(Cornell & Sheras, 2008; Augustyniak, 2005).  
Most threats made by children and adolescents lack genuine intent and capability to do harm. 
Despite this, school leaders must still act to maintain a safe learning space. So-called zero-tolerance 
policies sprouted up in schools following Columbine, removing situational context and professional 
discretion from the decision-making processes of school leaders, essentially labeling all threats of 
violence at school as equally serious (Cornell, 2011). While this may have relieved school leaders from 
having to make educated judgment calls based on facts and circumstances, it unnecessarily resulted in 
the criminalization of normal, albeit maladaptive child and adolescent behavior, further resulting in 
school suspensions, expulsions, even arrests and criminal charges against students who had no intention 
or means of harming anyone. Many of these students likely lacked crucial emotional coping and self-
regulatory skills.    
 Consequences of zero-tolerance school policies are heavy, and there is no data backing up their 
effectiveness.  In fact, one four-year study determined that schools with zero-tolerance policies had 
more crime than those without (Allen, et al., 2008). The educational, social, and legal outcomes for 
students who are suspended or expelled are poor compared to their peers. They are significantly behind 
in reading levels, and three-times as likely to drop out of school (Allen, et al., 2008).  
 Within months of the Columbine killings, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United 
States Secret Service applied their criminal profiling expertise toward trying to devise a way to identify 
students at risk of serious targeted violence toward their schools. Both agencies reached similar 
conclusions that discouraged the development of a “school shooter profile,” arguing that there was no 
useful or consistent combination of characteristics that would reliably predict a student’s propensity for 
attacking classmates and teachers with a firearm. Interestingly, the FBI’s analysis did reveal the 
SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT  6 
 
tendency for almost all school shooters to communicate, or “leak,” directly or indirectly, violent threats 
or disturbing behaviors prior to their attacks (Allen et al.,2008). What did eventually come of these 
analyses was a recommendation by the United States Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education 
that school leaders adopt a threat assessment approach toward the prevention of targeted school 
violence (Allen et al., 2008).  
 School-based threat assessment is a deductive, behavior-based process conducted in response to 
an actual threat of violence made in the school setting (Randazzo & Cameron, 2012). It is characterized 
by an identified victim or target, and specific to the context and actions of the person making the threat. 
The process usually happens in a dynamic and unstable environment, with a focus on identifying 
concerning behaviors and corresponding interventions to prevent a violent act from taking place. It’s 
crucial to recognize a school-based threat assessment process as a preventive, rather than predictive, 
response model (Mitchell & Palk, 2016), and is consistent with contemporary school initiatives like 
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Literature Review 
Threat Assessment Professional Development Training for K-12 Educators 
 School leaders unfamiliar with threat assessment need a process that is practical, efficient to 
implement, and capable of quickly determining which threats can be readily addressed as unremarkable 
or transient, since less serious threats are the preponderance of school-based threats of violence (Allen 
et al., 2008). In field test findings, 70% of  threats addressed by a threat assessment process were 
identified as the less-serious transient threats, allowing school administrators to resolve them quickly 
with minimal need for school disciplinary consequences (Cornell, Sheras, Kaplan, McConville, 
Douglas, Elkon, McKnight, Branson, & Cole, 2004).  In 2003, researchers at the University of Virginia 
collaborated with educators to develop a process school leaders could use in response to violent threats 
from students. Consistent with the requests of educators, the system was designed with a 
straightforward, initial assessment for threat seriousness, followed by a coherent decision tree to guide 
school actions toward resolving the threat. In more serious violent threats, further steps included a 
comprehensive safety assessment conducted by a multidisciplinary team, one that would include 
representatives of the education, mental health, and law enforcement fields (Allen et al., 2008).  
 Following field testing of the Virginia model for school threat assessment in 2001-2002, Cornell 
and Sheras (2006) published Guidelines for Responding to Student Threats of Violence, a 145-page 
manual that served as a companion resource for a 1-day educator training workshop. One of the 
challenges posed by threat assessment training for educators, law enforcement officers, and other 
school safety stakeholders is the incredible demands on their time by myriad responsibilities and 
commitments to other school and community related mandates, making even a one-day workshop 
overly burdensome for many. Another challenge to implementation is the vast difference in school 
climates and context, even within the same community. School and law enforcement leaders who orient 
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toward zero-tolerance policies may have difficulty adjusting to or even accepting a threat assessment 
system that endorses more discretion and flexibility in threat responses. Simply put, zero-tolerance 
policies are not compatible with a threat assessment model.  
 The goal of reviewing the literature on school violence threat assessment is to find the most 
relevant concepts and practices, then develop an abbreviated professional development training module 
without a lot of theory or fluff, specifically for school leaders, law enforcement, mental health, and 
other education professionals. Ultimately, school safety is a leadership issue. Declining student test 
scores, while discouraging, can be forgiven by many parents. They will, however, be less forgiving if 
something harms their children that could have been prevented or managed better (Trump, 2011). 
Making threat assessment training more accessible to educational leaders is a worthwhile endeavor 
toward safer schools for everyone.   
 Shortening of  training time and summarizing the need-to-know components of the school 
violence threat assessment process provides a more realistic and approachable training commitment, 
increasing the likelihood of attendance while respecting the heavy time constraints and obligations 
school leaders face. Condensation of the available literature into key components of the school violence 
threat assessment process reveals four core instructional themes relevant to abbreviated yet complete 
professional development training. These themes include: (a) general concepts of threat assessment; (b) 
threat assessment teams; (c) processes of threat assessment; and (d) documentation of the process. 
Supplemental information necessary to complete this training package should also include legal 
considerations and parity in administration of school discipline.  
The Virginia Threat Assessment Model provides the most clearly refined, practical, and 
evidence-informed school threat assessment model available to K-12 school districts. A randomized 
controlled study of the Virginia model provided strong empirical support for the use of threat 
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assessment in K-12 schools, as evidenced by increased referral to counseling services for youth 
offenders who made violent threats, and fewer long-term student suspensions (Cornell, Allen, & Fan, 
2012). A retrospective study (Cornell, Sheras, Gregory, & Fan, 2009) concluded schools using the 
Virginia model reported less bullying among students, more willingness to seek assistance, and 
improved school climate compared to schools using other models or none at all. 
Distinguishing the most salient, core components of this model will identify the need-to-know 
steps for abbreviated professional development training. These steps are logical, sequential, guided 
processes that can be efficiently followed with minimal preparation, training, or time, by overtasked 
school administrators. Supplementary worksheets, forms, and templates can be used concurrently with 
instruction to familiarize attendees with the threat assessment steps and documentation, using realistic 
threat-based scenarios. Ideally, this training would be conducted in a session 60 to 90 minutes in length, 
making more practical its presentation at professional educators’ conferences and workshops.   
Concepts of School Violence Threat Assessment 
 As a good school safety practice, school personnel must seriously consider all threats of school 
violence when they are first alerted. A protocol needs to be in place to manage and evaluate threats in a 
rational, balanced, and efficient manner. According to Kenneth Trump, author of Proactive School 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning, “The key is finding a balance between recognizing 
the red flags of potential violence that should raise educators’ eyebrows while still exercising care and 
caution to avoid inappropriate labeling and misidentification of children” (2011, p. 153). Trump argues 
that aggressive and violent threats must be considered and understood within developmental and 
environmental contexts. A student yelling out, “I’m going to kill you,” may represent lower levels of 
intent and capability when compared between an elementary playground and a high school cafeteria. 
Students must recognize that any threat of violence, even when they are not serious, is inappropriate 
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conduct in a school setting. Educators must recognize that, “A threat alone will not guarantee violence, 
nor does the absence of a threat guarantee that violence will not occur” (Trump, 2011, p. 172).  
 A threat assessment approach is a better way to consider the environment and context of violent 
threats, when compared to zero-tolerance policies. Educators may be uncomfortable adopting threat 
assessment practices. Some may prefer a checklist approach to addressing child and adolescent 
misbehavior, but by their very nature young peoples’ behaviors tend to be experimental and transitory, 
particularly among adolescents. Predictive models for adult behavior are notoriously inaccurate, even 
more so for children and teens (Trump, 2011).  
 Threat assessment is a decidedly non-predictive model for addressing school threats of violence. 
It’s a rational process focused on past and current behaviors, information gathered from the offender, 
victim, and witnesses, and careful assessment of the threat maker’s context and environment by a 
multidisciplinary team of education, law enforcement, and mental health professionals. Threat 
assessment is a system of steps focused on evaluating the seriousness of a threat and deciding what to 
do about addressing it to support a safe school environment. A sound threat assessment process will 
explore the mental health of a threat maker, their motivation for making a threat, and the existence of 
any plans to carry it out (Mitchell & Palk, 2016).  The process shares commonalities with clinical 
assessment of suicidal risk, identifying means, motive, and method to classify the seriousness of threats 
(Twemlow, Fonagy, Sacco, O’Toole, & Vernberg, 2002).  
 In the comprehensive Virginia threat assessment model, a decision-making tree is designed to 
help quickly determine the severity of a threat as transient (not serious) or substantive (serious). 
Substantive threats are further assessed and categorized as serious substantive or very serious 
substantive threats. Each threat level has its own suggested protocols for decision making by school 
administrators, providing guidance toward best practices to address the threat (Cornell et al., 2006).  
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 The threat assessment process continues for substantive threats, beyond the initial steps taken by 
the threat assessment team. Addressing the most immediate safety issues resulting from the threat must 
take priority, but at a certain point the team will consider how a student who has made a threat will be 
reintegrated back into the school setting or if appropriate, placement in an alternative learning setting 
(Cornell & Sheras, 2006). This part of the threat assessment process, aptly titled follow-up, may take 
place at once following the initial threat assessment, or after some time has passed.  
A threat assessment timeline will depend on the seriousness of the threat, the need to add team 
members as consultation resources, and the immediacy of other needs by school administrators to 
stabilize and safeguard the school building (Cornell & Sheras, 2006). Mental health services should be 
available to a student making a threat as soon as practicable, especially if the following behaviors have 
been observed or suspected: “Suicidal thoughts or attempts; attempts to cause the death or serious 
physical harm to another; intentional abuse of animals; setting fires; hallucinations or other delusions; 
specific plans, especially detailed ones, for committing violence” (Trump, 2011, p. 163). More than 
75% of children and adolescents who committed school shootings threatened or attempted suicide at 
some point prior to their attack, with over half of them experiencing a history of depression, loss of a 
significant relationship, or perception of a personal life-setback (Twemlow et al., 2002).   
 In 2018, the United States Secret Service released Enhancing School Safety Using A Threat 
Assessment Model, a 25-page operational guide for preventing targeted school violence. While many of 
the guide’s recommendations are similar to the Virginia threat assessment model, it’s simplified, eight-
step plan provides a more generalized overview of the core elements of an effective school violence 
threat assessment model, serving as a valuable supplement to existing or developing programs. These 
steps include: (a) establishing a multidisciplinary threat assessment team; (b) defining concerning and 
prohibited behaviors; (c) creating a central reporting system; (d) determining the threshold for law 
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enforcement intervention; (e) establishing assessment procedures; (f) developing risk management 
options; (g) creating and promoting safe school climates; and (h) conducting training for all 
stakeholders. Its conceptual focus provides a good starting point for school and law enforcement 
leaders, but it lacks the structural outlines, worksheets, decision making guidance, and case study 
examples of the Virgina model. Significant program development efforts would be necessary using the 
operational guide as a standalone resource, costing time and money school leaders may not have 
available.   
School Violence Threat Assessment Teams 
 Every school should have its own multidisciplinary threat assessment team, consisting of core 
members from school administration, mental health, and law enforcement or security. This might 
typically be a principal or assistant principal, a school counselor and/or school psychologist, and a 
school resource officer. Ancillary members should include teachers, community based mental health 
professionals, case managers, social workers, law enforcement officials, and when appropriate, parents 
of the threat maker. The team’s primary responsibility is to gather factual information about the threat, 
the person who made the threat, the context and environment of the threat, and any other information 
relevant to the threat (Pascopella, 2008).  
 Team members from varied professional backgrounds bring a wider perspective and scope of 
expertise to the investigative and assessment process. Education professionals have a keen sense of 
what works in a school setting, as well as direct knowledge of a student’s behavior patterns. Law 
enforcement officials can provide expertise in the areas of questioning, investigatory techniques, 
criminal law, and obtaining search warrants. School and community based mental health professionals 
can spot mental health crises and assess family dynamics (Barton, 2008). Establishing close 
partnerships and collaboration between team members is critical to the threat assessment process. A 
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key guiding concept for assembling a team is, “Getting the right people at the right table at the right 
time” (Bennett, 2015, p. 4). 
 A threat assessment team should have a clear statement of mission that defines its role and the 
types of situations it will handle. It should be granted formal authority through school policy to conduct 
investigations into threats and related behaviors of concern, and follow standardized procedures to 
identify persons of concern, gather information, assess threat levels, and implement risk management 
plans to reduce threat levels (Randazzo & Cameron, 2012). Clear guidance should be given, in both the 
training of team members and school policy, that threat assessment investigation must emphasize 
corroboration of facts about a threat-maker’s behavior, and development of behavior patterns that 
indicate escalation toward carrying out an act of violence (Reddy et al., 2001). Team members’ 
mindsets must focus on making logical and informed assessments on the credibility and seriousness of 
a threat in the initial triage stage (Cornell & Williams, 2012), and whether the person making the threat 
has the motive, resolve, and resources to carry it out (Augustyniak, 2005).   
School Violence Threat Assessment Process 
 Threat assessment consists of four key components: (a) learning of a person who may pose a 
violent threat; (b) gathering information about the threat maker from various sources; (c) determining if 
the person poses a threat of violence to others; and (d) planning and delivering an intervention to 
reduce the threat (Randazzo & Cameron, 2012). Every threat assessment process will begin with some 
form of “leakage.” This occurs when a student or other person reveals, intentionally or unintentionally, 
their feelings, thoughts, fantasies, attitudes, or intentions that may warn of an impending act of 
violence. Leakage in some form has been universally present in most cases of serious school violence. 
It’s one of the most critical warning behaviors of an adolescent’s intent to commit a violent act 
(O’Toole, 2001; Meloy & O’Toole, 2011).  
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The notion that a person suddenly snaps without warning and becomes a mass-killer is a myth. 
Research by the U.S. Secret Service on targeted violence indicates it’s neither random nor spontaneous, 
but rather the product of understandable patterns of thinking and behavior (Reddy, Borum, Berglund, 
Vossekuil, Fein, & Modzeleski, 2001). The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in its phase-II study, Pre-
Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013, concluded that 
adolescent school shooters under 18-years-old were more likely to reveal concerning behaviors to 
teachers and friends than to family members (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). Over all the active 
shooters studied, the authors identified an average of 4.7 concerning behaviors displayed to others prior 
to the killers’ attacks, reinforcing the theory that people who are serious about committing acts of 
violence toward their schoolmates will almost always “leak” clues that should signal alarm and 
potentially be used to prevent a violent act.   
 Leakage may include efforts to recruit classmates and friends, to knowingly or unwittingly help 
with preparing for a violent act, for example, obtaining a firearm and ammunition. It could also 
represent a cry for help, symbolize inner conflict, or serve to boast about violent plans that others don’t 
take seriously (O’Toole, 2001). Conduits of leakage are not limited to verbal communications. They 
may include notes, diaries, online communications, videos, social media posts, school assignments, 
graffiti, or other means. Common themes in leakage may include, “Violence, hopelessness, despair, 
hatred, isolation, loneliness, nihilism, or an “end of the world” philosophy” (Meloy, Hoffmann, 
Guldimann, & James, 2011, p. 262). In 81% of the school shootings researched by the United States 
Secret Service in 2000, at least one other person knew the shooter was planning or at least thinking 
about carrying out a school attack. In 93% of those cases, the attacker engaged in some sort of 
disturbing behavior that concerned others around them (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011).  
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 Unrecognized or unacknowledged leakage short circuits violence prevention and intervention 
processes in schools. Students and other school staff untrained in recognizing concerning behaviors and 
communications lack the knowledge to tell someone who can intervene. Human rationalization, 
minimalization, or outright denial that leakage represents a real threat prevents and delays the 
information from reaching a trained school employee. When several people are aware of the leakage, 
the bystander or Good Samaritan effect makes it less likely that one person will take action to report 
threats or actions hinting at violent acts (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011).   
The earlier leakage is identified and interpreted, the timelier and more effective a threat 
assessment response will be, emphasizing the importance of students and school personnel being at 
least somewhat familiar with what concerning behaviors are, in addition to positive school climates that 
encourage reporting without fear of retaliation or breach of confidentiality. The school violence threat 
assessment process is set in motion when someone hears of or witnesses a violent threat through 
leakage. It focuses on the behavior and communications of the threat maker, and the logical conclusions 
those facts support regarding the person’s plans, ideas, and ability to cause harm (Randazzo & 
Cameron, 2012).  
 According to the collaborative work Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing 
Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, by the United States Secret Service and 
U.S. Department of Education (Fein, 2006), six underlying principles of effective threat assessment 
should be integrated into professional development training on all threat assessment models: (1) 
Targeted violence results from an understandable process of thinking and behavior; (2) Targeted 
violence stems from interaction with the person, situation, setting, and target; (3) An investigative and 
inquisitive mindset is critical; (4) Effective assessments are based on facts, not characteristics or traits; 
(5) An integrated systems approach should guide threat assessment investigations; (6) Every threat 
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should receive prompt attention. These principles are overarching mindsets school administrators will 
need to effectively carry out school violence threat assessments, regardless of the model they use.   
Seven Steps of the Virginia Threat Assessment Model 
 Before initiation of a threat assessment process, school leaders should prioritize the immediate 
physical safety of students and staff (Stover, 2005). This will be dependent on the context of the violent 
threat and existing school crisis response protocols. A student making a verbal threat to “beat up” a 
classmate at recess will not likely rise to the same level of threat as a student with a hit-list, detailed 
maps of the school, and prior weapons offenses. If a threat rises to the level of immediate and imminent 
violence, securing the school building, notifying law enforcement, and containing the threat-maker will 
be paramount.  
 A seven-step decision tree guides the team through the threat assessment process (Cornell, 
2011). In step one, the student or other person who made the threat is interviewed by the team leader, 
usually a school administrator, using a standardized set of questions. Further interviews are conducted 
with witnesses to the threat or behavior to further ascertain situational and environmental factors. Less 
concerned with the verbal content itself, the team leader focuses on the context of the threat. In step 
two, the team leader classifies easily resolved threats as transient, and more serious threats as 
substantive. Transient threats are more clearly identified as byproducts of expressed anger or frustration 
and dissipate quickly. Step three involves finding a resolution to the transient threat by making amends, 
without conducting a more comprehensive threat assessment. If there is any doubt about whether a 
threat is transient or substantive, it is treated as substantive.  
 If the team leader determines a threat is substantive, step four determines if the threat is serious 
or very serious. Differentiation of these levels is made based on the intended severity of injury to the 
victim. Assaulting by hitting or kicking is a serious substantive threat, whereas sexual assault, seriously 
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injuring, or killing someone is a very serious substantive threat. Any intention to use a dangerous 
weapon is generally classified as a very serious substantive threat.  
 In the event of a serious substantive threat, step five requires action of school officials to protect 
the potential victim through direct notification of the victim and their parents, among other preventative 
steps and interventions. Step six, taken if a threat is assessed as a very serious substantive threat, 
requires immediate protective action to protect the victim and thoroughly evaluate the threat-maker, 
leading to implementation of a written safety plan in step seven. Both steps five and six may likely 
include notification of law enforcement.  
 Cornell (2018) developed an updated five-step decision-making tree to act as a navigation guide 
for  key threat assessment steps, as part of his Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines 
(CSTAG).  Abbreviated professional development training should feature this decision-making tree and 
accompanying documentary forms for threat-makers and victims as important supplemental materials. 
Ideally, threat assessment team members who infrequently use the process can refer to these materials 
as a guide when they initiate a response to a school-based threat of violence.  
School Violence Threat Assessment Documentation 
 Good threat assessment documentation is helpful – unless it’s not. Documenting good decision-
making processes can serve to justify those decisions later, based on the context in which they were 
made. Using care during the documentation process to preserve the rationale and thought processes for 
team decisions will help avoid shedding an unflattering light on the team’s work in the event it’s later 
questioned. Quality, defensible documentation should be fair, objective, reasonable, and timely (Nolan 
& Moncure, 2012). Rather than relying on notes, emails, and other means of recording the team’s work, 
use of existing threat assessment templates and forms ensures clarity and uniformity of documentation, 
while minimizing the chance of missing important steps in the process (Cornell & Sheras, 2006). 
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Documentation of follow-up, interventions, and monitoring strategies to make sure threatening 
situations don’t reemerge is sound threat management practice (Bennett, 2015).  
 Storage and dissemination of threat assessment documentation brings up some valid concerns 
related to the requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The commonly held misperception that 
school threat assessment teams cannot share vital safety information outside of the immediate team can 
be debunked by a better understanding of the health and safety exceptions to FERPA and HIPAA 
privacy requirements. If private information is shared in good faith in order to prevent an act of 
violence or other unsafe situation, the release of that information is lawful (Nolan & Moncure, 2012). 
Another concern may be the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which, while broad in its 
coverage, does not require a school or institution to, “Tolerate behavior that poses a direct threat to 
others, or that renders a student or employee not qualified to participate in the academic, residential, or 
work environment” (Nolan & Moncure, 2012, p. 336). In any event, prioritizing the immediate safety 
of the school occupants while making good-faith decisions, based on the best information available at 
the time, will always be a defensible course of action. When questions come up regarding the release of 
educational, health, or disability records as part of the threat assessment process, consultation with 
school district legal counsel is advised.  
Legal Considerations 
 K-12 schools are generally expected to exercise due care in provide a learning environment that 
is reasonably safe from foreseeable acts of violence. If a school employee, either through act or 
omission, does not exercise reasonable care that proximally results in physical or emotional harm to 
employees or students, the school system may be negligent. Reasonable care is a duty expected of 
school administrators and other school employees based on their special relationship with students and 
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other persons in a school facility (Keeping Your School Safe & Secure: A Practical Guide, 2012). This 
is an important concept for school leaders to keep in mind when recognizing that there is always some 
level of duty to keep students and school employees safe from violent acts perpetrated by other students 
or third parties (Nolan & Moncure, 2012). Developing an evidence-informed school violence threat 
assessment process and implementing it with fidelity are key tasks to meeting the due care standard in 
providing a safe school environment. School leaders who ignore violent threats do so at their own peril.  
 While students do have First Amendment rights to freedom of speech at school, these rights do 
not extend to speech that would reasonably be expected to disrupt a safe and effective learning 
environment. In a Georgia case, Boim v. Fulton County School Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007), the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that school officials have a compelling interest in acting 
quickly to prevent school violence” (Keeping Your School Safe & Secure: A Practical Guide, 2012, p. 
92). There is legal precedent to limit the freedom of speech rights enjoyed by students while at school 
or school events, particularly concerning violent threats.  
Parity in Threat Assessment and School Discipline 
 One of the key advantages to threat assessment rather than zero-tolerance approaches is its less 
punitive nature. Strong and Cornell (2008) studied the implementation of the Virginia model in 
Memphis city schools, concluding that most of the students referred for threat assessment returned to 
school or continued their education in an alternate setting. Fewer students were subjected to long-term 
suspensions and only a handful were expelled, compared to numbers prior to threat assessment-based 
practices. They noted, however that students in special education who made threats of violence were 
overrepresented, four times higher than students in the general education setting. Students living with 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and emotional disturbances were most likely to make threats at 
school. The authors noted promising results that supported further study of threat assessment, as well as 
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interventions that could potentially be included in individualized education plans for students in special 
education.  
 A statewide study of school-based threat assessment implementation in Virginia revealed a 
disproportionate number of African American students were referred for threat assessment, compared 
to their White, Asian, and Hispanic classmates, consistent with higher rates of school disciplinary 
referrals for Black students nationwide. Interestingly, there was no disparity of disciplinary outcomes 
when using threat assessment, such as suspensions, expulsions, and alternative placements, in the same 
comparison (Cornell, Maeng, Burnette, Jia, Huang, Konold, Datta, Malone, & Meyer, 2018). The most 
common predictive factors for school disciplinary consequences was assessment of a threat as serious 
and possession of a weapon (Cornell, Maeng, Huang, Shukla, & Konold, 2018). This warrants further 
study on the effect threat assessment may have on reducing racial disparities in school disciplinary 
sanctions, including exclusion.  
Conclusion 
 Maintaining safe and effective learning environments is a primary duty of K-12 school 
administrators. Threats of violence disrupt school operations and promote unhealthy school climates. 
School leaders require effective, evidence-informed strategies to quickly respond to bona fide violent 
threats, while avoiding mislabeling or harshly punishing child and adolescent students who make the 
majority of school-based threats but pose no real danger. School-based threat assessment is a promising 
tool for school leaders, one that will allow them to objectively identify, investigate, and intervene in a 
collaborative, problem-solving method, rather than a punitive, zero-tolerance approach.  
 The Virginia Threat Assessment Model is an evidence informed intervention that can be 
efficiently presented to school administrators and other school safety stakeholders by abbreviating the 
training into four core themes: (a) general concepts of threat assessment; (b) threat assessment teams; 
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(c) processes of threat assessment; and (d) documentation. Additional training concepts should include 
legal considerations and parity in school discipline. Studies and field analyses of the Virginia model 
indicate its implementation can improve school climates, reduce bullying, suspensions, and expulsions, 
and increase likelihood of positive behavioral supports and interventions for students who lack 























 This training manual includes all the necessary information to prepare and guide a professional 
instructor in delivering the content effectively and efficiently. Carefully reviewing the manual, 
rehearsing delivery, and gathering equipment and other supplies several days prior to a scheduled 
presentation is highly recommended. The instructor should arrive at the training venue with enough 
time to set up and test equipment, distribute handouts, and conduct a brief review of the presentation.  
For content the instructor is not comfortably familiar with, a careful review of the reference literature is 
recommended prior to delivery of the presentation. The instructor should arrange for and/or prepare the 
following equipment, materials, and training aids prior to a professional development training session:  
• Audio-video equipment appropriate to the training venue, to include a reliable laptop computer, 
AC power adapter and outlet strip, local network Wi-Fi passwords, projector, screen, audio 
system, remote slide control/pointer, spare batteries, microphone, etc.  
• Presentation PowerPoint, accessible at: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UyGaibUoqob9cwxLJMv9bfo4854yHfsd/view?usp=sharing  
• Course evaluation forms and pre/post assessments (Appendix A, pages 39-40).  
• Supplemental training handouts (Appendix B, pages 41-66), such as threat assessment 
worksheets, evaluation forms, and other supporting materials.  
• Sharable weblinks to threat assessment resources and instructor contact information.  
• Alternative online survey and assessment links in lieu of printed pre and post-assessments and 
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Presentation and Training Manual 
 This presentation and training manual are designed to be used together, to provide an 
abbreviated professional development session on school violence threat prevention. The topics are 
logically and sequentially arranged to provide easily digestible content to familiarize K-12 educational 
leaders with best practices in  school-based threats of violence. Much of the theory and research behind 
school-based threat assessment has been de-emphasized to focus instructional content into the most 
“need-to-know,” practical information. Training may run between 60-90 minutes, depending on local 
need, time constraints, and whether the practical threat assessment determination exercise (slides 21-
24) will be included in the training session. This training manual is organized as a companion to the 
presentation slides and serves as an instructor guide and script.  
 Participant completion of this abbreviated training is considered a familiarization with the 
concepts of  Dr. Cornell’s Virginia Model and updated Comprehensive School Threat Assessment 
Guidelines (CSTAG) for  school violence threat assessment, as well as other relevant research and best 
practices. It is not intended in any way to imply professional certification, licensure, or any other 
credential specific to threat assessment. This training should be provided to K-12 educational 








SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT  24 
 
Presenter Slide Guide and Notes 
Slide 1 - Title Screen  
Adjust title screen as needed. Welcome and introduction of instructor; housekeeping comments: 
restrooms, exits, time of presentation, distribute classroom handouts, Wi-Fi password posted, if needed. 
Circulate sign-in roster, to include name, agency/district affiliation, position, email, and phone number.  
Notes:  
Slide 2 - School Violence Threat Assessment: Overview & Training Objectives  
Briefly describe what will be covered in the training overview. If the practical exercise will not be part 
of the training, change the training duration time to 60-minutes. Review the training objectives.  
Notes:  
Slide 3 – Knowledge Pre-Assessment  
The nine-question knowledge pre-assessment can be completed on paper (Appendix A) or via online 
platform, like Survey Monkey or Kahoot, in about 4-5 minutes. Consider having both options available 
and be sure to keep records on participants scores. Review questions and correct answers before 
proceeding.   
Online Link/Notes:  
Slide 4 - Introduction  
Main points:  
• Public perception, even educator perception, is influenced by media coverage of school 
violence; contrary to widespread belief, acts of school violence are rare, although threats of 
violence are quite common 
• We need to be better at identifying and separating mild threats from more serious ones, rather 
than taking a one-size-fits-all approach 
• Violence prevention is always better than reacting to violence 
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• Threat assessment is a preventive and collaborative approach toward preventing school 
violence, and is better for several reasons (see sub-points on slide) 
Notes:  
Slide 5 - Video: Waseca, MN, May 2nd, 2014    (2:43) 
When very serious threats of violence do exist, what systems do our schools have in place to evaluate 
and act to prevent violence? What signs or concerning behaviors might exist that go noticed or 
unnoticed? (Show video) 
• If you were a school official who received the citizen tip, what would your next steps be? 
• If the citizen tip had not been reported to the Waseca Police, how else do you think could this 
have been prevented?  
• Mention the concept of leakage and how perpetrators of school violence typically broadcast 
their intentions to do harm prior to an attack.  
Notes:  
Slide 6 - Concepts of School Violence Threat Assessment  
Although most threats of school violence are not accompanied by the intent and capability to carry 
them out, educators still need to take them seriously. Threat assessment is a:  
• Rational, balanced, and efficient process that considers the developmental level of the student 
and environmental factors. This is in direct contrast to so-called Zero-Tolerance policies.  
• We know children and adolescents are transitioning in their identities and do frequently act out 
in ways contrary to their baseline behaviors. We may see this as experimentation.  
Notes:  
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Slide 7 – Concepts of School Violence Threat Assessment 
Threat assessment is a preventive, rather than predictive model. Human behavior is very difficult to 
predict. Both the FBI and US Secret Service discouraged the development of a “school shooter 
profile,” arguing there was no consistent combination of characteristics that would reliably predict a 
student’s propensity toward targeted school violence.  
• This is a rational process that focuses on behaviors, past and current 
• We gather information from several sources 
• We consider the offenders context and environment 
Our focus is on an organized, multidisciplinary, and collaborative process to determine the seriousness 
of a threat, and how to respond to it. 
Notes:  
Slide 8 - Threat Assessment Considers  
The main questions we ask in this process are:  
• What is the mental health status of the offender? 
• What is their motivation for making the threat? 
• Do they have plans to carry out the threat? 
The School Threat Assessment Decision Tree helps guide the threat assessment process in a logical and 
stepped manner, making your assessment process clearer and easier. This is very similar to a suicide 
risk assessment.  
Notes:  
Slide 9 – Leakage: “Every Threat Assessment Starts Here” 
What makes threat assessment so effective is the concept of leakage. Targeted violent acts in schools 
almost never happen in a vacuum, and they rarely happen spontaneously. Leakage is when an offender 
intentionally or unintentionally reveals their feelings thoughts, fantasies, attitudes, or intentions that 
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may warn of an act of violence. It’s almost universally present in cases of serious school violence and 
is one of the most critical warning behaviors.  
• Targeted violence is the product of understandable patterns of thinking and behavior (U.S. 
Secret Service). 
• School shooters under 18-years old were more likely to reveal concerning behaviors to friends 
and teachers than to their parents (Federal Bureau of Investigation).  
• School shooters displayed an average of 4.7 concerning behaviors prior to a school attack.  
Notes:  
Slide 10 - Video: Leakage – What was Missed?    (4:55) 
Please watch and listen for leakage or opportunities for detection in this story out of Colorado (play 
video)  What did you see or hear? 
• “Talk about doing a lot of harm and sadness.” 
• “F Society” on side of car. Similarities to Columbine killers? Others? 
How do you think a threat assessment process might prevent acts of school violence like this? 
Notes:  
Slide 11 - Threat Assessment Team  
Every school should have a designated assessment team, representing at minimum administration, 
mental health, and law enforcement or security. Typically, this will be a principal, counselor, and 
school resource officer as core members. Depending on the threat level and student needs, this could 
expand to include case managers, teachers, community-based mental health providers, even parents. A 
diverse team will bring wider perspectives to assessment and decision making.  
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Team responsibilities include gathering factual information relevant to the threat, the threat maker, 
the context of the threat, and the environment it was made in. Close partnerships and collaboration are 
critical to an effective threat assessment.  
Assessment teams need to have a clear statement of mission and the authority through school policy to 
investigate and make decisions. The teams primary responsibility is corroboration of facts about a 
threat maker’s behavior and indications of escalation toward carrying out an act of violence.  
Notes:  
Slide 12 - Threat Assessment Process  
The threat assessment process starts when we are alerted to a violent threat, usually through leakage. 
This is a deductive, fact finding process focused on the offending student’s behavior and 
communication. We are primarily concerned with the threat maker’s plans, ideas, and their capability to 
harm others. Keep in mind this is NOT an effort at predicting whether or not a violent act will 
happen – we can’t accurately predict human behavior. This is a preventive process. We are 
determining the nature of the threat and what we need to do to prevent it from happening.  
Notes:  
Slide 13 – Six Underlying Principles of Threat Assessment 
To assess violent threats well, we need to keep these underlying six principles in mind:  
• As crazy as we may think their rationale is, we need to consider the threat maker’s beliefs as an 
understandable process. There’s always a reason “why” the threat happened and the resulting 
behavior, as irrational as it may be to us.  
• All threats and violent acts include interactions between people, circumstances, a setting, and a 
target.  
• We need to approach every assessment objectively, with curiosity and an open mind.  
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• We must stay focused on the facts we know, not speculation about characteristics or traits.  
• A systems approach will be more effective – this means interdisciplinary collaboration and 
consideration of environment and context.  
• We must act promptly with any threat that comes to our attention.  
Notes: 
Slide 14 – CSTAG Step 1 – Evaluate the Threat  
*Refer to the Threat Assessment and Response Protocol form in the handout 
This is arguably the most crucial step in the assessment process, as it will shape the rest of your threat 
assessment work. Primarily, when you are alerted to a threat your most immediate concern is the safety 
of your building occupants. Take protective action when necessary and isolate the threat maker in the 
more serious threats. Don’t hesitate to contact law enforcement for help if the threat involves serious 
bodily injury or a weapon.  
Step 1 involves gathering information through an initial investigation. This will include interviews of 
several people. The time you invest in this stage is well spent. If the threat turns out to be transient or a 
“non-threat,” you can stop here. In many cases, this is where you will conclude your threat assessment 
process. Use your School Threat Assessment Decision Tree (p. 42) to guide your investigation.  
Notes: Citation – Cornell, 2018 – Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG) 
Slide 15 – CSTAG Step 2 - Attempt to Resolve as Transient 
When you determine a violent threat has occurred, step 2 is as far as most threat assessments will go. 
Threats of violence are common in schools, while acts of violence are relatively rare. If the threat 
maker was expressing frustration, anger, or humor, and has no intent to cause harm, consider the 
threat transient and add services as needed. When in doubt about the student’s intentions, 
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genuineness, sorrow, or willingness to repair the situation, move on to step 3 and consider the threat 
substantive. You can always return to step 2 – transient – if circumstances change.  
Notes:  
Slide 16 – CSTAG Step 3 - Respond to Serious or Very Serious Substantive Threat 
Substantive threats include intent to do harm. These are categorized into serious and very serious 
substantive threats. Serious substantive threats include fighting, hitting, beating up, or other physical 
violence that does not imply serious bodily injury, sexual assault, or use of a weapon. Very serious 
substantive threats include use of a weapon, serious bodily injury, rape, and killing. In all threats, do the 
following: protect potential victims, including warning them and their parent(s); look for ways to 
resolve the conflict; use school discipline when appropriate; and refer for services. This is when your 
threat assessment team will be vital for service referrals.  
Notes:  
Slide 17 – CSTAG Step 4 – Conduct Safety Evaluation for Very Serious Substantive Threat 
This is the worst-case threat assessment – implied use of a weapon, serious bodily injury, raping, or 
killing. The priority will be stabilizing the school building and isolating the threat maker in a 
supervised, secure area. It would be wise to notify law enforcement and request assistance, as this may 
lead to a criminal investigation and charges. Don’t spend too much time investigating at the outset. If 
you are reasonably confident the threat is very serious, halt the assessment process and contain the 
situation, immediately. Once the threat maker is sent home or with law enforcement, you have more 
time to assemble your team, take a deep breath, and resume your threat assessment process. This may 
include referral of student for mental health screening/risk assessment; alternative placement and/or 
suspension, pending expulsion in some cases; police criminal investigation; student/staff interviews; 
safety plan development; IEP/504 review and further assessment if the student receives services. 
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Slide 18 – CSTAG Step 5 – Implement and Monitor Safety Plan 
A safety plan will be used for school reintegration of the student offender. The threat assessment team 
will work together to craft a plan that will include various levels of support, in some ways like a tier-3 
MTSS plan. In some cases, the student and parent(s) may also contribute to the plan. In all cases, the 
plan will be communicated to the student and parent prior to returning to school and monitored by a 
designated school representative for effectiveness and revisions. Sometimes these safety plans will 
require a mental health risk assessment prior to readmission to school. Be sure to consult with your 
district’s legal counsel for guidance on this, as mandated risk assessments could become the fiscal 
responsibility of the school district. A sample risk assessment with questionnaires is included in your 
handout. Mental health risk assessments are typically conducted by specially trained clinical mental 
health professionals and fall outside the training and qualifications of most school counselors.  
Notes:  
Slide 19 - Follow-Up and Documentation  
Careful and accurate recordkeeping is vital to defending and justifying your team’s decisions 
throughout the threat assessment process. It’s a way to preserve the reasoning and thought processes 
that went into the assessment. Be sure your documentation is fair, objective, reasonable, and timely. 
One of the questions that is often asked is, “Where do we keep these records?” That depends on the 
guidance you receive from your legal counsel. Keep in mind that all records included in a student’s 
academic record are subject to FERPA and reviewable by students and parents.  
Notes:  
Slide 20 – Break – 5 Minutes 
Be firm on the break, as you will have limited time to cover all the content. Set an exact time for 
participants to be back in their seats.  
SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT  32 
 
Slide 21 – Evaluating Threat Severity – Practical Exercise 
Let’s use our School Threat Assessment Decision Tree to assign threat levels. You will have three 
scenarios to consider in the next slides. Read the scenario, consider the questions, and use your 
handouts to decide how you would handle each situation. Ready? 
Notes:  
Slide 22 – Scenario 1 
Please read the scenario and answer the questions. You have 5 minutes. (Use a timer to keep time) 
When time is up, call “time” and open for discussion by group or individual. Start with threat 
classification, then what actions might come next. Keep an eye on your time.  
Notes:  
Slide 23 – Scenario 2 
Next scenario, you have 5-minutes. (Use a timer to keep time) 
When time is up, call “time” and open for discussion by group or individual. Start with threat 
classification, then what actions might come next. Keep an eye on your time.  
Notes:  
Slide 24 – Scenario 3 
Next scenario, you have 5-minutes. (Use a timer to keep time) 
When time is up, call “time” and open for discussion by group or individual. Start with threat 
classification, then what actions might come next. Keep an eye on your time.  
Notes:  
Slide 25 - Legal Considerations  
As educators, we have a duty to protect others within our facilities under the legal concept of special 
relationship. This is true as it pertains to protecting students and staff from foreseeable acts of violence. 
Adopting a school violence threat assessment process is considered a best practice and when 
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implemented with fidelity and good faith, meets a standard of reasonable care. We cannot predict or 
react to events that are not “foreseeable,” but we certainly have a compelling interest in preventing acts 
of violence we have prior warning about. Case law supports this legal requirement, as per Boim v. 
Fulton County School District which addresses limitations on freedom of speech of students at school. 
Case law summary is in the participant handout, Appendix B.  
Notes: 
Slide 26 - Parity in School Discipline 
Something to consider is the less punitive nature of a threat assessment approach, in comparison to zero 
tolerance school discipline policies. Several studies have concluded that when threat assessment is 
used, there is no disparity of disciplinary outcomes - but there needs to be more research to corroborate 
that data. Current data supports the fact that African American students are disproportionately 
disciplined in comparison with students of other races, and students receiving special services are 
overrepresented as students who make violent threats, particularly those with ADHD and ED. What we 
can reasonably conclude is that because threat assessment is a deductive, objective process that focuses 
on facts rather than traits and characteristics, school discipline is more consistently applied to threat 
makers.  
Notes:  
Slide 27 - Knowledge Post-Assessment  
The nine-question knowledge post-assessment can be completed on paper (Appendix A, p. 39)) or via 
online platform, like Survey Monkey or Kahoot, in about 4-5 minutes. Consider having both options 
available and be sure to keep records on participants scores. Review questions and correct answers 
before proceeding.   
Online Link/Notes:  
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Slide 28 - Course Evaluation and Instructor Contact  
Ask attendees to fill out a paper or online course evaluation before leaving. Collect post-assessments, 
course evaluations, and attendance roster. Thank attendees, offer instructor contact information for 
questions and/or future training requests.  
Notes/evaluation link:  
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Appendix A 
School Violence Threat Assessment – Knowledge PRE/POST Assessment 
Name: ____________________________________________ Date: ________________________________________ 
School/Agency: ________________________________________ Position/Title: ______________________________ 
1. School violence threat assessment is a ____________________ process.  
a. Predictive and collaborative 
b. Preventive and collaborative 
c. Conclusive and predictive 
 
2. At minimum, a school threat assessment team should consist of  ________________________.  
a. Administrator, school mental health specialist, case-manager 
b. Administrator, parent/guardian, teacher 
c. Administrator, school mental health specialist, law enforcement/security 
 
3. Most violent threats in schools are ________________________________________________.  
a. Likely to be carried out 
b. Maladaptive responses from children/adolescents who lack essential skills 
c. Made by children/adolescents who intend to and are fully capable of carrying them out 
 




5. Schools can use traits and behaviors to accurately “profile” and predict which students will commit acts of violence 




6.  In field test findings, ____ of threats addressed through a threat assessment process were identified as less serious, 





7. In       of researched school shootings, at least one other person knew the attacker was planning or thinking about 
the attack. In ___ of those cases, the attacker displayed disturbing behavior that concerned others around them.  
a. 70%; 61% 
b. 81%; 93% 
c. 99%; 82% 
 
8. The basic steps of a school threat assessment process are ____________________________________.  
a. assess, convene, act, document, follow-up 
b. evaluate threat, attempt to resolve as transient, respond to substantive threat, conduct safety evaluation for very 
serious substantive threat, implement and monitor safety plan 
c. alert, assess, act, follow-up, record 
 
9. Targeted school violence results from _____________________________________________.  
a. Bad parenting and/or lack of discipline at home 
b. Mental illness and/or other childhood trauma 
c. An understandable process of thinking and behavior 
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Course and Instructor Evaluation Form 
School Violence Threat Assessment Professional Development Training 
Your honest and sincere evaluation of this course helps ensure that our programs are of the  
highest caliber and that they meet and exceed your training needs. Thank you! 
 
Date: ______________________ Location: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Instructor(s): _________________________Your Position/Title: ________________________________________ 
          5   Outstanding 
          4   More than satisfactory 
       Rating Scale:  3  Satisfactory 
          2   Less than satisfactory 
          1  Poor 




1. Printed materials were well organized 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
2. Printed materials were complete 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
3. Printed materials were readable (printed well) 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
4. Visual materials were related to course 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
5. Visual materials were in appropriate quantity 5 4 3 2 1 NA 





7. Covered subjects I thought it would 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
8. Was a reasonable length 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
9. Contributed to my knowledge and skills 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
10. Related to my needs 5 4 3 2 1 NA 






12. Related course materials to class needs 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
13. Knew subject thoroughly 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
14. Encouraged class participation 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
15. Made course requirements and objectives clear 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
16. Stayed on subject 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
17. Answered questions completely 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
18. Tolerated differences of opinion 5 4 3 2 1 NA 
 
Facility: 19. Minimal distractions 5 4 3 2 1 NA 




















What did you find of most value in this course? 
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Appendix B 
Handouts/Forms for the Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines 
Available at https://www.schoolta.com/s/Forms-for-Comprehensive-School-Threat-Assessment-
Guidelines-8-9-19.docx as part of the Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines: 
Intervention and Support to Prevent School Violence (Cornell, 2018).  
 
What is the purpose of these forms? 
These forms are used to conduct a threat assessment, as explained in the manual, Comprehensive School 
Threat Assessment Guidelines: Intervention and Support to Prevent Violence1, or other training 
resources. 
 
Do I conduct a threat assessment for all threats?  
No. It is not feasible or necessary to conduct a formal assessment for clearly insignificant behavior such 
as playful bantering or joking. Conduct a threat assessment if there is some reason to be concerned about 
the behavior. When in doubt about a threat, conduct a threat assessment.  
 
Do I use all these forms for every threat assessment case? 
No. Transient cases are documented with only a few pages (Threat Report, Interview(s), Key 
Observations, Threat Response), whereas only very serious substantive threats are likely to use all of the 
forms. In large samples, approximately 75% of cases are transient and fewer than 10% are very serious 
substantive threats.  
 
Do I complete every section of each form?  
No. These forms are intended as guidelines to help you consider the most likely aspects of a case, but 
you will use your judgment as to what is appropriate for your assessment and intervention. 
 
Who completes the forms? 
Threat assessment is a team process and can be documented by any member of the team. A transient 
threat might be handled by just one team member (preferably in consultation with at least one other team 
member), whereas a substantive threat will likely engage several team members.  
 
Can I modify these forms? 
Yes, within reasonable limits that do not significantly alter the CSTAG process. Be sure that changes are 
approved by your school system. Some school systems will modify the terminology (e.g., ‘safety 
screening’ versus “mental health assessment”) or make other adjustments. For example, some schools 
systems add a place to document who carries out each step of the assessment or add a form to track 
changes when a student receives ongoing services. Schools can use online versions of these forms, too.   
 
If a threat is resolved, do I change the threat classification to “no threat”? 
No. The threat classification reflects your initial assessment and guides your next steps, regardless of 
how the threat is resolved. Occasionally, the threat classification might change if you find, for example, 
that a transient case is more serious than you thought and should be changed to a substantive threat. The 
resolution of a threat should be recorded in the Case Plan section.   
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Should I document transient threats? 
Yes. If a student later carries out a threat that was previously judged to be transient, you will want 
documentation to show that you made a defensible effort to assess the threat. If a student makes multiple 
threats, documentation will provide a useful perspective.  
 
 
Where should I file these forms? 
 
Follow the guidance of your school system to determine where you file records. Some school systems 
choose to file some, or all of the threat assessment forms in the student’s educational record and others 
choose to file some or all of the forms outside of the educational record. Any information placed in the 
student’s educational record is subject to FERPA restrictions. 
 
(Cornell, 2018) 






THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE PROTOCOL© 
Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines 
OVERVIEW 
 
A threat is a communication of intent to harm someone that may be spoken, written, gestured, or expressed in some other form, such as via text 
messaging, email, or other digital means. An expression of intent to harm someone is considered a threat regardless of whether it is communicated 
to the intended target(s) and regardless of whether the intended target is aware of the threat. Threats may be implied by behavior that an observer 
would reasonably regard as threatening, planning, or preparing to commit a violent act. When in doubt, treat the communication or behavior as a 
threat and conduct a threat assessment. Threats that are not easily recognized as harmless (e.g., an obvious joke that worries no one) should be 
reported to the school administrator or other team members. The administrator or another team member makes a preliminary determination of 
the seriousness of the threat. The student, targets of the threat, and other witnesses should be interviewed to obtain information using this 
protocol. A transient threat means there is no sustained intent to harm and a substantive threat means the intent is present (or not clear) and 
therefore requires protective action. This form is a guide for conducting a threat assessment, but each case may have unique features that require 
some modification. 
 
A threat assessment is not a crisis response. If there is indication that violence is imminent (e.g., person has a firearm at school or is on the way to 
school to attack someone), a crisis response is appropriate. Take immediate action such as calling 911 and follow the school crisis response plan.  
School Threat Assessment Decision Tree* 
 Step 1. Evaluate the threat.   
  Obtain a detailed account of the threat, usually by interviewing the person who made 
the threat, the intended victim, and other witnesses. Write the exact content of the 
threat and key observations by each party. Consider the circumstances in which the 
threat was made and the student’s intentions. Is there communication of intent to 
harm someone or behavior suggesting intent to harm? 
  No 
 
Not a threat. Might be an 
expression of anger that merits 
attention.  
                            Yes   
 Step 2. Attempt to resolve the threat as transient.   
  Is the threat an expression of humor, rhetoric, anger, or frustration that can be easily 
resolved so that there is no intent to harm? Does the person retract the threat or 
offer an explanation and/or apology that indicates no future intent to harm anyone? 
  Yes 
 
Case resolved as transient; add 
services as needed. 
                              No   
 Step 3. Respond to a substantive threat.   
  For all substantive threats: 
a. Take precautions to protect potential victims. 
b. Warn intended victim and parents. 
c. Look for ways to resolve conflict. 






Case resolved as serious 
substantive threat; add services 
as needed. 
  Serious means a threat to hit, fight, or beat up whereas very serious means a threat to 
kill, rape, or cause very serious injury with a weapon. 
           Very Serious   
 Step 4. Conduct a safety evaluation for a very serious substantive threat.   
  In addition to a-d above, the student may be briefly placed elsewhere or suspended 
pending completion of the following: 
e. Screen student for mental health services and counseling; refer as needed.  
f. Law enforcement investigation for evidence of planning and preparation, 
criminal activity. 
g. Develop safety plan that reduces risk and addresses student needs. Plan should 
include review of Individual Educational Plan if already receiving special 
education services and further assessment if possible disability. 
  
     
 Step 5. Implement and monitor the safety plan.   
  Document the plan. 
Maintain contact with the student. 
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(Cornell, 2018)  

























Use additional pages as needed. This is a list of common actions taken in response to a threat. Each case may require a unique set of actions. Add 
date and signature of person taking action if appropriate. Note if action was recommended but for some reason not completed (e.g., parent 
refusal). 
❑ 1. Increased contact/monitoring of subject  
❑ 2. Reprimand or warning  
❑ 3. Parent conference  
❑ 4. Student apology  
❑ 
5. Contacted target of threat, including parent if 
target is a minor 
 
❑ 6. Counseling (note number of meetings)  
❑ 7. Conflict mediation  
❑ 8. Schedule change 
 
 
❑ 9. Transportation change 
 
 
❑ 10. Mental health assessment   
❑ 11. Mental health services in school  
❑ 12. Mental health services outside school  
❑ 13. Assess need for special education services  
❑ 
14. Review of Individualized Education Program 
(IEP) for students already receiving services 
 
❑ 15. 504 plan or modification of 504 plan.  
❑ 16. Behavior Support Plan created or modified  
❑ 17. In-school time out or suspension  
❑ 18. Out-of-school suspension (number days)  
❑ 19. Referral for expulsion  
❑ 20. Other disciplinary action  
❑ 
21. Change in school placement (e.g., transfer, 
homebound instruction) 
 
❑ 22. Services for other persons affected by threat  
❑ 23. Law enforcement consulted  
❑ 24. Legal actions (e.g., arrest,  detentions, charges)   
❑ 25. Other actions  
 
CASE PLAN 
This section can be used to describe the plan for any case and should be completed as Step 5 in cases of a very serious substantive threat. 




Describe how case was resolved, including any plan for further actions. List persons responsible for each component of plan. 
 
Follow-up or Revision of Plan Date  
Describe current status of plan and any revisions. List persons responsible for each component of revised plan. 
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Mental Health Assessment Report Template 
Identifying Information  
Give the student’s name, gender, age, grade, school, and other relevant identifying information.  
 
Reason for Referral 
State that this evaluation was requested by the school principal because the student made a threat of 
violence that was judged to be a very serious, substantive threat. Describe the threat, including the exact 
statement or threatening behavior, and where and when it took place.  
 
Sources of Information 
Describe or list the sources of information used in this report, including information from team 




Describe how the child presented and any important aspects of his or her mental state, including any 
indications or markers of mental disorder requiring further evaluation or referral. Identify any stresses, 
conflicts, or unmet needs that affect the child’s functioning or bear on the threat incident.  
 
Review the child’s understanding of the threat and its meaning from his or her perspective. Note 
whether the child has a history of violent or aggressive behavior, and any findings from the assessment 
that raise concerns about the child’s potential for violence, such as access to firearms, peer 
encouragement to fight, drug use, or inadequate home supervision. 
 
Conclusions 
In general, the mental health professional should not be expected to make a definitive statement that a 
child is or is not dangerous; such statements go beyond current knowledge in the field of risk 
assessment. The report may identify risk factors and protective factors, and express concerns where 
there appear to be compelling risk factors.  
 
The report should present recommendations aimed at  reducing the risk of violence, and  they might 
convey the degree of concern about the potential for violence in general terms, recognizing that a 
precise measure of risk is not feasible. In all cases, the goal is to reduce the risk of violence rather than 
to predict violence.  
 
Recommendations may include a wide range of strategies but should address both any immediate safety 
needs to protect potential victims and broader efforts to resolve conflicts or problems that precipitated 
the threat.  
 
There are two basic types of recommendations. First are recommendations for school behavior support, 
which are actions to be taken at school. The report should identify any signs of disability that would 
indicate the need for further assessment, child study, or special education evaluation. Second, if 
appropriate, the report may propose other recommendations for the parents to consider implementing 
outside of school, such as seeking community-based services for their child.  
 
(Cornell, 2018)  
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Court rules against student who wrote violent dream story (Free speech rights in school) 
August 3, 2007Judy Wang 
GEORGIA — A federal appeals court ruled July 31 against a Fulton County student who claimed that 
her school violated her free-speech rights when it punished her for writing about a dream in which a 
student shoots a math teacher. 
Rachel Boim, then a ninth grader at Roswell High School, was suspended and nearly expelled in 
October 2003 for keeping a journal with the violent entry. A federal judge in Atlanta dismissed Boim’s 
First Amendment lawsuit last year because, the decision reads, her writing was “sufficiently disturbing” 
to merit discipline. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals also agreed with the school and cited the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morse v. Frederick in its ruling. 
According to court documents, Boim’s notebook was discovered when she was caught passing it to 
another student during class. The teacher confiscated the notebook and found that, under a divider 
labeled “Dream,” Boim had written about shooting a male math teacher. 
“I stand up and pull the gun from my pocket. BANG the force blows him back and every one in the 
class sit [sic] there in shock,” she wrote. 
The teacher reported the notebook to Fulton County School District officials, who expressed concern 
that the student’s writing constituted a threat against her male math teacher. The school suspended 
Boim and attempted to expel her, but the Fulton County Board of Education overturned the expulsion 
on an appeal by Boim. The Boim family filed suit two years later to take the suspension off Boim’s 
record, arguing that the school’s actions violated the First Amendment. But the district court found that 
the school was within its rights, prompting the family to appeal to the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
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The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision that the Fulton County School District’s 
concerns were justifiable by referring to violent incidents on school grounds, such as the Columbine 
High School and Virginia Tech University shootings. The appeals court ruling, authored by Judge Joel 
F. Dubina, notes that there had been at least 10 student perpetrated shootings at U.S. schools in the 
eight years prior to Boim’s suspension, citing statistics from Wikipedia, an online user-created 
encyclopedia, and an article posted on CNN.com. 
The decision cites the student speech standard established by the 1969 Supreme Court decision 
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, arguing that Boim’s speech could 
create a “substantial disruption” in the school. The decision also cites Morse, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a school’s right to punish a student for hoisting what it interpreted as a 
banner advocating illegal drug-use, to conclude that, “the same rationale applies equally, if not 
more strongly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat of school violence.” 
“There is no First Amendment right allowing a student to knowingly make comments, whether oral or 
written, that reasonably could be perceived as a threat of school violence, whether general or specific, 
while on school property during the school day,” the court opinion said. 
“As we feared,” said Student Press Law Center Executive Director Mark Goodman, “Courts are using 
Morse as authority to justify acts of censorship far beyond the circumstances of that ruling.” 
Judge Susan H. Black wrote in a concurring opinion in Boim v. Fulton County School District that 
stated the court’s decision could have been decided under the Tinker standard alone. 
Although she lost in the appeals court, Boim can continue the two-year-old case by asking for a 
rehearing by the full 11th Circuit or by appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, if she chooses. 
Carol Callaway, an attorney for the school district, said she is pleased that the court upheld a school 
official’s right to act in the school’s best interests in light of a “perceived threat.” She said she is unsure 
SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT  67 
 
whether the Boim family will continue the lawsuit.Boim’s attorney, Don Keenan, could not be reached 
for comment. Boim wrote for her school’s student newspaper, The Sting. 
For More Information: 
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., No. 06-14706-JJ, 2007 WL 2177677 (11th Cir. July 31, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
